



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXI NUMBER 15

## Ten-Point Program for U.S. in Asia

by Chester Bowles

NEW DELHI—In the coming months and certainly within the coming year, the American people will be called upon to reassess their foreign policy. Barring an attack by the Soviet armies, Western Europe will soon be strong enough and the NATO objective of a military balance in this crucial area of the world will be well on its way to achievement.

If this is accomplished, we will have every reason for satisfaction. Starting with the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey, through the Marshall plan, the crisis of the Berlin air lift and the North Atlantic pact, we have faced up boldly and imaginatively to the danger of Soviet aggression in Europe.

But it would be reckless indeed to assume that the establishment of a military balance in Europe will mean that the Soviet threat has passed. With the European door closed to further immediate expansion, inevitably the Politburo will intensify and expand its already dangerously successful efforts in Asia.

The new threat now in the making represents a profound challenge to our imagination, intelligence and above all to our flexibility—perhaps greater than the problems of European stability with which we have been suc-

cessfully contending. To the American people, Europe is familiar ground. Eighty per cent of us are descended from European immigrants. Our culture and our history are closely related to those of Western Europe. Through the bitter experience of two world wars we have learned the hard way that any threat to the stability of Europe directly endangers our own security.

Of Asia we are largely ignorant. The history of China, Japan, India and other Asian countries is rarely taught in American schools. All that most Americans know about Asia is that the people look different, think differently, act differently, and that most of them are very, very poor.

But our ignorance of Asia is only part of our handicap. Although we have a long tradition of opposition to colonialism, there are few Asians who are familiar with that fact. Aided and abetted by skillful Soviet propaganda, a dangerously large number associate us with the nineteenth-century colonialism of European powers as white oppressors or would-be oppressors.

Nor are these all of the obstacles which face us in establishing a clear-cut Asian policy.

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An essential part of our European policies, in addition to economic rehabilitation and greater economic and political cooperation, has consisted of military alliances and military preparedness.

Korea has demonstrated that armed aggression, whether it be in Europe or Asia, must be promptly met with force. But anyone who suggests that the kind of military agreements developed so successfully in Europe can now be extended to the non-Communist countries of South Asia simply is not facing up to the facts.

A final roadblock to clear thinking on Asia is our deep-seated political disagreement about the reasons for the Communist victory in China in 1949. After three years of bitter accusations and counteraccusations most of us have accumulated such a heavy load of prejudices that objective discussion has become increasingly difficult.

### Living Standards the Test

However, if we are to implement an effective, unified Asian policy in time, these hurdles must be overcome. If we fail, the result will be catastrophic.

Lenin once said, "The road to Paris lies through Calcutta and Peking." To any thoughtful observer, the meaning of this statement is clear—a Communist Asia might well jeopardize the position of free countries throughout the world and eventually lead to a Communist-dominated world.

The present situation in India

dramatizes this ominous possibility. Today India is the world's largest democracy. In four and a half years of independence, India has established complete freedom of speech, free elections, democratic courts, and a parliamentary system based on the best British, French, and American experience.

But the ultimate test of this new Asian democracy will be its ability to raise the living standards of the people, and on this test the future not only of India but of Asia will largely stand or fall.

A solid majority of the Indian people are hopeful that democracy can do for them what it has done for many Western nations. But in many parts of India there is an ominous, growing uncertainty. In four large states in South India, the Communists' vote in the recent elections far exceeded their most optimistic hopes. The next few fateful years will tell the story.

If India goes under, no thoughtful observer will question the fact that democracy in Asia is finished, and a Red Asia may well set in motion the deadly cycle of events to which Lenin alluded. Throughout the world hundreds of millions of our present friends would become convinced they were backing the wrong horse. A serious blow would be struck at the morale of our European allies. The balance in world strength would begin to tip against us.

Any effort to pooh-pooh the very real possibility of this development in the next few years is both reckless and irresponsible. To meet this

danger successfully will require the very best that the United States has to offer—plus a generous measure of good luck.

What exactly can we do? Here are some suggestions:

### Bipartisan Policy Needed

1. Do not allow the November elections to blind us to the crying need for national unity in implementing a positive Asian policy which thoughtful Democrats and Republicans can support regardless of past disagreements.

2. Do not get panicky and, above all, do not minimize the very real advantages which are available to us. It is fortunate, for instance, that India holds a key position in establishing Asia's future.

An overwhelming majority of the Indian people are dedicated to the democratic ideal and are extremely anxious to prove that higher living standards can be achieved in Asia by democratic techniques.

In spite of our occasional disagreements with Prime Minister Nehru on specific questions, no one can question his deep personal devotion to democracy, his willingness to meet communism head-on when it challenges his internal policies, and his tremendous popularity among the Indian people. Today Nehru stands as the strongest individual anti-Communist force in Asia.

3. Be patient in our dealings with Asian nations and their problems. Solutions are not going to be found overnight, and ill-considered judg-

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## Danger Signals in Latin America

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in 1947, calls for solidarity among the American republics, but solidarity does not at present exist in the Western Hemisphere. Nationalism is stronger in Latin America than the obligations and implications in the treaty, and nationalism is on the rise.

### Political Instability

Internal political upheavals and instability currently mark the affairs of Latin American countries. In Cuba on March 10 General Fulgencio Batista effected a *coup d'état* which removed President Carlos Prío Socarras from office. Batista has designated himself chief of staff, a dictator—a role he played in 1934-1940, assuming the office of president from 1940 to 1944. Batista's principal instrument in the March coup was the Army, but he suffered little opposition from other elements in the Cuban population. Corruption is common in Cuban governments. The Prío administration was just as corrupt as usual, and its violent departure evoked few regrets.

Through the coup Batista won by force what he might not have won by due process. He was the candidate of the Unitarian Action party for the office of president, with elections slated for June. His prospects for victory seemed less bright than those of Carlos Hevia, favored by President Prío, and of Roberto Agramonte, of the Orthodoxos party. Now Batista has postponed the presidential election indefinitely. In foreign policy, Batista has said that he will closely support the United States.

Batista's pro-Washingtonism partly salves the wounds his violence has

inflicted on democratic sensibilities. Cuba is one of the few American republics which have signed an agreement with the United States making them eligible to receive grants of military equipment. American military aid will now, in effect, strengthen the Batista dictatorship in Cuba. Germán Arciniegas, former Colombian minister of education now living in the United States, in his new book, *The State of Latin America*, points out that Washington, by giving military assistance to Latin American countries ruled by dictators, thereby helps not democracy but dictatorship. The Mexican government, affected by the rise of nationalistic anti-American spirit, has refused to sign a military aid agreement.

Brazil signed a mutual aid agreement on March 15, 1952, but now the possibility has arisen that the Brazilians might repudiate or ignore the agreement if a dictator does not come forward to enforce it. One of the purposes of the American policy of military aid is to repress the influence of Russian-inspired Communists in the countries aided. On March 18 it became known that Communists, whose party was outlawed in Brazil five years ago, had infiltrated the Brazilian Army and that in military politics they support the former war minister, General Newton Estillac Leal. This information became public property upon the resignation of General Euclides Zenobio de Costa, commander of Brazil's World War II expeditionary force to Italy, from his present command over the First Military Region. Five Army sergeants were then arrested on suspicion of being Communists. The situation remains confused.

General Zenobio emerges as a foe of communism, but the number and importance of Communists in the Army and in the War Office are unknown. The basis for the violent overturn at some future date of the government of President Getulio Vargas has been laid, however, through allegation of sympathy between one of his cabinet ministers and the Communists.

### Resentment Against U. S.

Both nationalism and dictatorship in Latin America partly reflect resentment against the United States. "I do not need to restate the inestimable importance of Latin America," President Truman said in the message he sent on March 6 to Congress recommending continuation of the Mutual Security Program. Nevertheless, many Latin Americans consider themselves neglected or injured by the policies of the United States. The 20 southern republics have received only a tiny fraction of Washington's international loans and grants during the postwar years and vigorously complain about this. While the cost of manufactured goods that Latin Americans import from this country has been going up steadily, the United States has tried to hold down the prices it pays for Latin America's raw materials, notably Bolivian tin. Our Congressmen, moreover, have sought to raise tariff barriers against exports from Latin America. The resulting mutual recriminations do not contribute to hemisphere solidarity.

BLAIR BOLLES

(Mr. Bolles is the author of the current best-seller, *How to Get Rich in Washington*, published by Norton.)



## Asian Problems of United States

### IS OUR ASIAN POLICY WRONG?

by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Dr. Schlesinger, associate professor of history at Harvard University, is co-author, with Richard H. Rovere, of *The General and the President* (New York, Farrar, Straus, 1951), a discussion of the issues raised by the dismissal of General MacArthur.

**I** KNOW nothing about Asia; but I have found consolation in the ancient maxim of Confucius that Asian policy is too important to be left in the hands of the Asian experts. In that spirit, I am prepared to hazard a few general propositions.

1. The United States must have two broad objectives in Asia: to guide the Asian social revolution into constructive channels; and to prevent the further spread of aggressive communism, whether Russian or Chinese.

2. Although in the long run these two objectives strengthen each other, in the short run they conflict. The conflict is inescapable because the Korean war has made us define a vital part of the struggle against communism in Asia in military terms. We were absolutely right to respond in military terms in Korea. But our military emphasis there has handicapped our attempt to win over the Asian social revolution in those parts of Asia not under the threat of immediate attack. The lack of foresight in these other areas, their failure to understand the aggressive character of Communist imperialism, are exasperating; but this is part of the problem.

#### United Front in Asia

3. For the sake of our broad objectives in Asia, we should liquidate our military activities in Korea as quickly as possible. But no armistice can be acceptable whose terms might tempt the Chinese Communists to further experiments in aggression.

4. We must take other steps to guard against further Chinese Com-

munist aggression in Asia. The first step is to develop a united front within our own country and between ourselves and Britain on the determination to react against such aggression. Any indications of hesitancy on our own part, or of division between ourselves and Britain, will only embolden the men of Peiping. Of course, this policy of advance warning is a gamble; but any policy less than this would invite Chinese expansion. As to what measures we would actually undertake in case of Chinese aggression, this would depend on circumstances to be carefully considered. There are strong arguments against most measures. The bombing of cities, for example, would be politically suicidal; but we certainly should not deny ourselves any measure in advance.

5. Chiang Kai-shek and the island of Formosa have military importance to us so long as actual fighting goes on in the China area. There is, in my judgment, no political future in Chiang Kai-shek. Should stabilization approach in the Far East, Formosa should be placed under the United Nations, and Chiang Kai-shek should go into honorable retirement at the Waldorf-Astoria. The use of Chiang's troops against the mainland has no merit except as a cruel and subtle way of destroying Chiang's army.

6. In the long run we must look for a divergence between Communist China and the U.S.S.R., understanding, however, that the promotion of a divergence cannot be, as such, the object of our policy. Obviously, the surest way to bring about

a split would be to give Mao Tse-tung a free hand in Asia; but this strategy would entail major risks of its own. Nor can we think intelligently in terms of "weaning" the Chinese Communists away from Moscow. The only thing that will cause Peiping to break with Moscow would be intolerable demands from Moscow. While expressing our determination to react strongly against new Chinese aggression, we should otherwise leave Communist China alone. We should not exclude the possibility, once Communist China is purged of the taint of its present aggressions, of its admission to the United Nations.

7. For the rest of Asia, we should press as hard as possible our programs of economic and technical cooperation, educational exchange, cultural relations and so on, in order to persuade the new rising elites that national and economic liberation are possible within a framework of friendship for the West. We must take care here to avoid the mistakes which delivered China into the hands of the Communists.

8. The original question was, "Is our Asian policy wrong?" In terms of the seven points outlined above, my answer would be that our Asian policy is not wrong. It is, however, deformed by various pressures: in the United States, by the Republican pressures against economic and technical assistance and in favor of all-out support for Chiang Kai-shek; in Britain, by Socialist pressures in favor of "weaning" Mao from Moscow and against presenting a united

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## WHAT SHOULD U. S. DO ABOUT FORMOSA?

by Russell H. Fifield

Dr. Fifield, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, has been active in the work of the Detroit Foreign Policy Association. Before coming to the University of Michigan in 1947 he was an American Foreign Service officer in China and Formosa.

**T**HE question of Formosa is not only a partisan issue in the United States but also a serious threat to Allied unity in the cold war. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's latest stronghold has become a symbol—for good or for ill, depending upon one's point of view—of American postwar policy in the Far East. Indeed, it might be stated that Woodrow Wilson had his Shantung, Franklin D. Roosevelt his Yalta, and Harry S. Truman his Formosa. The influence of the United States, without the firm support of its major ally, Britain, is singularly reflected in the attitude of the United Nations toward Nationalist China and in the recognition policies of the different governments of the world, especially those of the Far East, including Japan.

American policy toward Formosa since the Generalissimo made Taipei the capital of his China has reflected the pressures of domestic and international politics. On January 5, 1950 President Truman announced that the United States would not give military assistance or advice to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. In effect he was letting the Chinese themselves, Communists as well as Nationalists, settle the issue over the island. From the diplomatic point of view, the five months that followed offered Mao Tse-tung the best, and probably the final, opportunity to invade Formosa with a minimum of international repercussions.

The North Korean Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950 caused President Truman to announce two days

later that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa from invasion and that he was asking the Chinese Nationalists to desist from military operations on the mainland of China. The American decision to "neutralize" Formosa for the duration of the Korean hostilities, it should be noted, was made outside the framework of the United Nations action in Korea.

The intervention of the Chinese Communists in late 1950 in the Korean war led to the present American policy toward Formosa which may be characterized as a greater recognition of its strategic importance; a determination not to let it fall into Communist hands, and the building up of Chiang Kai-shek's forces for the defense of the island but not as yet for an invasion of the China mainland.

The consequences of the fall of Formosa to Mao Tse-tung merit careful analysis. Strategically the island lies between the Ryukyus, where the United States will soon ask the United Nations for a trusteeship, and the Philippines, now linked more strongly than ever to the United States by the mutual assistance treaty of August 30, 1951. The loss of Formosa to the Western cause would definitely weaken the island arc of the American security system in the Western Pacific. Moreover, the Communist movements within the countries of Southeast Asia would be encouraged to further revolutionary activity. The Republic of the Philippines is especially sensitive to developments in Formosa as a result of the location of the archi-

pelago and the activities of the Communist-led Hukbalahaps against the Manila government.

Moreover, the large Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, possibly numbering 10 million people, would be left with no Chinese alternative to Mao Tse-tung if the Generalissimo lost his present bastion. Communist China, under such circumstances, would also find it easier to win recognition in the United Nations. The loss of the Nationalist army in being, which at the present time poses a potential threat to the Communists, would further strengthen Mao's position in the Far East. And finally the Communist conquest of Formosa would have definite repercussions in the United States.

### Could Chiang Succeed?

The issue now actually emerging in American domestic politics is whether or not to "take the wraps off" Chiang's Nationalist forces and allow them to operate at will against the Chinese mainland. Since American air, naval and logistical assistance would be necessary for any sustained effort of the Generalissimo in China, apart from sporadic raids, the issue assumes even greater importance than appears on the surface.

Two fundamental questions stand out in the controversy as far as the Chinese are concerned: How effectively would the Nationalist soldiers fight the Communists? and How would the people of China receive Chiang Kai-shek? No definitive answers, of course, can be given. It seems likely, however, that the armed forces of the Generalissimo, if properly led, trained and equipped, would make a creditable showing, certainly in defending Formosa and probably in fighting on the mainland. Much would depend upon the strength of the Communists and on

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## Schlesinger

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American-British front against aggression in Southeast Asia:

9. No policy in Asia, in my judgment, has any certainty of great positive results. Even the programs of economic and technical assistance may result simply in putting stronger weapons into the hands of irresponsible Asian nationalism. But our present policy runs as few risks as any. If it could be protected, both here and abroad, from the pressures which threaten to pervert it, it might have a fighting chance.

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the degree of American logistical, naval and air assistance. At the same time it should be noted that the total armed forces on Nationalist Formosa number less than 600,000 men; about half of them first-line foot soldiers.

Even more important is the issue of the reaction of the Chinese people to the possible return of Chiang Kai-shek. In Chinese politics, it may be stated, the Generalissimo still remains the alternative to Mao Tse-tung, for there is no leader who represents a real "third force." In his

66th year, Chiang, enjoying excellent health, is fully confident of his restoration. But the attitude of the mainland Chinese is problematical.

The Generalissimo, in outlining his case, compares his record on Formosa with that of the Communists in China. In fact, it does appear that the Nationalists are not like the Bourbons of France: the reasons for the rise of Communist China have been analyzed, a program of reform is under way in Formosa, and plans are ready for the mainland when the occasion arises. Developments under the present administration include the improvement of economic conditions and definite land reforms; increased self-government, with the participation of the Formosan-Chinese; the practical eradication of communism with the maintenance of law and order; and the reorganization of both the Nationalist government and the Kuomintang.

On the other hand, the regime of Mao Tse-tung has betrayed through its record of imperialistic aggression the best interests of the Chinese people. Instead of bringing peace to China, it has brought war. Moreover, by its policy of cooperation with, if not subservience to, the Soviet Union it has prostituted the

genuine nationalism of the Chinese people in favor of a new and harsher era of "unequal treaties." Under these conditions promise and performance in domestic politics bear little relationship. The probable effect of the Communist foreign policy is to create a situation that may become conducive to the possible restoration of the Generalissimo.

In the final analysis the return of Chiang Kai-shek to the mainland of China depends upon the development of world events. If a third world war breaks out in Asia or if the present explosive situation increases in intensity, the West must find an Asiatic leader to match the Mao's and Ho's of the Far East. Chiang's record against communism is unchallenged; his opposition to foreign imperialism in China whether Japanese or Russian is well known; he may have redeemed himself for many of his mistakes on the mainland by his record in Formosa. He once held out against the Japanese when the key areas of China were lost to the invaders, but he lived to see the end of the Japanese New Order and his restoration to Nanking. A variation of this accomplishment might be repeated in the shifting sands of world politics.



### FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

## What Kind of Peace for Germany?

The Kremlin's identical notes of March 10 to the United States, Britain and France outlining a proposed German peace treaty marked the opening of a new stage in what has sometimes been poetically described as the struggle for "the soul" of Germany. Placed by the accident of geography in the center of the European continent, the German people have throughout their history oscillated between West and East.

Now that the United States, spokesman for the North Atlantic alliance, is offering Bonn the prospect of integration with Western Europe, the U.S.S.R., raising the bid, holds out to the West Germans the many-faceted possibilities of unification with the East Germans, frontier adjustments, national armaments, neutrality between East and West, and unhampered trade with the East. Seven years after a defeat sealed

by unconditional surrender, the Germans have the heady experience of being courted by both camps of the wartime coalition that brought about Hitler's downfall.

### Terms of West and Moscow

The Russian note of March 10 called for the end of German partition and the "most rapid formation of a general German government," to be followed within a year by the



withdrawal of all foreign armies and the liquidation of all foreign military bases in Germany. The Kremlin's draft treaty provides that "the existence of organizations hostile to democracy and to the cause of maintaining peace must not be allowed" on German territory—a phrase which in Soviet usage could cover all anti-Communist groups; and that "all former members of the German army, including officers and generals" as well as former Nazis, be granted civil and political rights on a par with other German citizens.

The most controversial feature of the proposed treaty, particularly from the point of view of European Communists who had assumed that Moscow would irrevocably oppose German rearmament, is the provision that Germany should have "national land, air and sea forces for the defense of the country" and plants to produce war materials and equipment. Germany, under the Russian draft, would give a pledge not to enter any coalition aimed at a power which had fought against it in World War II—clearly a pledge to abstain from participation in NATO. No limitations would be placed on Germany as to trade with other countries and access to world markets—a broad hint that current restrictions on East-West trade would be lifted with the conclusion of the peace treaty.

In similar notes of March 25 the United States, Britain and France rejected the Soviet Union's proposal for the creation of an armed, unified and neutral Germany. The former enemy country, said the Western powers, should be unified but only as a result of free, UN-supervised elections in both West and East Germany; German military forces, no matter how limited, should not be under the sole control of the German government; Germany should not be

placed in a position of enforced neutrality but should be able and willing to join the internationally controlled European army. The United States also implied that Washington is not prepared to agree—at least for the time being—to the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern frontier of Germany.

### Pros and Cons

From the point of view of the Western powers the Russian proposals, no longer dismissed as a mere propaganda device, have far-reaching implications. It is clear that the Kremlin is determined to prevent Germany from becoming irretrievably committed to the West, and particularly from participating in a Western-controlled army. To achieve this objective the Soviet government appears to be willing to make a series of concessions.

While such concessions might seem unfavorable to Russia and might conceivably jeopardize its future hold on non-Russian Communist allies who would fear future jettisoning of their interests, Moscow would stand to make substantial gains which it might well regard as sufficient to offset possible losses. If Germany can be detached from Western Europe and particularly from the United States, the NATO coalition might be weakened, and this without any sacrifices of men or materials by the U.S.S.R. Moreover, Russia could then hope to attain the objective it has nurtured since Germany's defeat—that is, access to the steel resources of the Ruhr and to other manufactured products of the technically advanced German industries. These would be of inestimable value not only in strengthening the Russian "arsenal," as French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman put it on March 24, but also, if war does not come, for the accelerated industrialization

of Russia, Eastern Europe and Communist China.

Even if the Kremlin, contrary to the expectations of Bonn, London, Paris and Washington, does accept the Western demand for free elections in both West and East Germany under the supervision of the United Nations Commission or of some other agency, this would not necessarily redound to Moscow's disadvantage. For most political observers believe that a free all-German election might well bring about the defeat of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who has been the mainstay of the West, and the victory of the Social Democrats, who, although vigorously opposed to communism, are also critical of the United States. The Kremlin is prepared to go even further. By proposing a sweeping restoration of former Nazis to public life, it makes clear that it would be quite prepared to work with a rightist government at Bonn, postponing for the time being the possibility of advancing the Communist cause in Germany.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

### Bowles

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ment, scoldings and criticisms will alienate Asian people beyond recall. Above all, stop arguing that anyone who fails to agree with everything we do must be taking orders from Moscow.

4. Present to the world the real America of Jefferson, Lincoln and Wilson, and not the superficial picture that Asian nations often get of a United States arrogant with wealth and power, capable only of creating machinery and bombs, and without ideals or sensitivity to the convictions of others.

5. Remember that we were the first colonial possession to gain its independence, and take every oppor-

tunity to express our historic dislike of imperialism in any form.

6. We can not wish away the fact that our record on racial prejudice is not perfect. But we are making rapid progress and we should do a better job of letting people know about it.

7. Never forget that to a majority of Asia's people freedom of speech and freedom to vote will sound increasingly empty and meaningless unless democracy succeeds in helping them to grow more food for their hungry families. Democracy can succeed in India and other parts of Asia only if it provides a basis for increasing living standards for all of the people.

### **India's Food Program**

8. Do not get discouraged about the problems of population and food supply. If India's agriculture were only as productive as that of Egypt, its annual supply of food would be twice as great.

By the end of 1956 India's Five-Year Plan *with our help* can increase total food production 20 per cent. This would eliminate the need to import food from abroad, and in addition provide the average Indian family with a substantially better diet. The hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign exchange now used each year to pay for imported grains and cotton could then be put

to work where the money is needed most—speeding up Indian industrialization.

This essential 20 per cent increase in food production can be achieved only by a substantial step-up in our present village-by-village program of better seeds, increased irrigation projects, better public health and increased literacy. The program now under way draws heavily from previous failures to meet communism successfully in Asia. It is a realistic down-to-earth, house-to-house, village-to-village effort already tested and proven in actual practice.

Twelve thousand villages will begin to receive the benefits of our present Point Four program in the next few months. But our minimum objective must be 200,000 villages and 120 million people by 1956. In each area covered, a 50 per cent increase in food production can be readily achieved within that time.

The cost of this village-to-village program plus essential help for major irrigation projects would be actually less than the economic aid that we put into tiny Greece in a similar period, and on a per capita basis it is only an infinitesimal portion of our contribution to the countries of Western Europe.

9. Meet the Communist challenge in Asia to the best of our ability as we have already met the Soviet chal-

lenge in Europe, but don't assume that communism in Asia or anywhere else can be stopped by money alone. However, money plus intelligence, plus tact, plus patience, plus respect for the rights and convictions of others, plus good administration on the part of the Indian government, plus a little luck can drastically improve the present situation in the next few years and go a long way towards building India into the solid democratic Asian bastion which it so earnestly wants to be.

10. Above all, resist the temptation to think on a purely anti-Communist basis. This plays into Moscow's hands because it leads us to react to what the Russians are doing rather than to build positive programs of our own.

We can not kill the Communist idea with machine guns. We can meet communism successfully only with a better idea. That better idea is dynamic democracy based solidly on the best traditions of our American history. If we have the courage and imagination as a people to adopt this kind of approach, there is every reason to hope that within five years not only a stable Europe but a stable Asia will be in the making, and that the tide of world communism will begin to recede.

(Mr. Bowles, former governor of Connecticut, is the United States ambassador to India.)

## **FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN**

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### *In the next issue*

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by Professor C. Clyde Mitchell, former head  
of National Land Administration  
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